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Abstract 
This paper explores the patterns of the division of inter-vivos financial transfers from old parents to adult 
children in a sample of 14 European countries drawn from two waves of the Survey of Health, Aging, and 
Retirement in Europe. Contrary to previous research mostly focused in US, this study finds a higher 
frequency of parents that equally divide their financial transfers among their adult children. On average, 
36% of European parents divide equally. These results sharply contrast with approximately 6.4%-9.2% of 
American parents that divide equally. It is possible that altruistic parents are also concerned with a norm 
of equal division, and therefore they do not fully offset the differences of income among their children as 
predicted by the standard model of altruism. The econometric results show that parents are more likely to 
give equal transfers if, in their view, income inequality among their children is not too high. Furthermore, 
the analysis is extended by adding variables at the country level. In this regard, income inequality, pension 
expenditures, the societal level of altruism and inheritance taxes are key to explain country differences. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on family financial transfers has long established the key relationship between 
motives of parents to provide financial transfers to adult children and the final effects of 
intergenerational redistributive policies. For example, a redistributive policy favouring the old 
over the young can be neutralized if the family is linked by altruism because altruistic parents will 
offset the reduction in child income with financial transfers (Becker 1974, Barro 1974 and Tomes 
1981). In contrast, the so-called exchange approach (Bernheim et al. 1985 and Cox 1987) 
considers that strategic motives explain transfer behaviour as parents seek to obtain various child 
services in return (e.g., help, visits, companion). In this case, the reduction of child income is only 
partly compensated by the parent, and therefore the redistributive policy is not fully neutralized.  
 Family financial transfers are given in the form of inter-vivos transfers and bequests. In the 
empirical literature, mostly based on US data, it is generally accepted that inter-vivos transfers 
are given unequally to children while bequests are mostly equally divided. Studies by McGarry 
(1999), Light and McGarry (2004) and Norton and Van Houtven (2006) find that 83%, 92% and 
95% of parents in US intend to give equal bequests, respectively. In contrast, equal inter-vivos 
transfers occurs only in 6.4% to 9.2% households (McGarry 1999 and Hochguertel and Ohlsson 
2009). The equal division of states among children is also prevalent in Europe (see Table 1), but 
what is sharply different between US and Europe is the high frequency of equal division of inter-
vivos transfers. Indeed, data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) reveals that approximately one third of parents in 14 European countries make equal 
transfers to their children, though there is substantial regional variation. For example, countries 
such as Sweden and Denmark show more than 45% of parents giving equal transfers, while that 
Greece show a figure of 16%. Equal division of inter-vivos transfers has not been extensively 
studied nor observed in previous studies, being perhaps the study by Halvorsen and Thoresen 
(2011) the only one focussed on studying the determinants of equal transfers in an European 
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country (in Norway). A high prevalence of equal division cannot be solely explained by the 
standard approaches of altruism and exchange, and pose an interesting challenge to the empirical 
literature on family transfers. Therefore, the aim of the present paper is to study the patterns of 
the division of parental inter-vivos transfers in Europe. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of parents giving equal transfers or bequests to children 
 
 
 This paper differs from existing empirical literature in several respects. This exploits a dataset 
with rich and harmonized information on parental transfers for a sample of 14 European countries, 
which complements previous studies focussed on only one country. It is argued that parents are 
altruistic and also equality-minded, meaning that they want to give equal transfers to all their 
children. The generation and strength of the social norm of equal division is not studied; instead, 
a stylised theoretical model considers altruistic parents that are concerned with this norm to 
different degrees. This setting highlights the tension between being altruistic towards children 
(i.e., favouring the poorer child with larger transfers) and following the norm of equal division. 
% N % N
Sweden 49.3 676 95.0 220
Denmark 45.0 402 89.8 167
Belgium 43.7 263 97.8 135
France 38.5 330 92.5 133
Italy 36.7 256 96.4 169
Czech Republic 35.9 167 89.7 156
Switzerland 35.5 197 98.3 59
Netherlands 35.3 363 89.3 103
Austria 32.1 224 89.4 104
Germany 27.3 462 78.7 47
Poland 22.1 113 75.9 112
Spain 20.0 40 92.2 219
Ireland 18.4 38 n.a. n.a.
Greece 16.0 344 89.7 87
EU total 36.2 90.4
US 6.4-9.2 83.0-95.0
Note: For inter-vivos transfers, figures in Europe are computed with SHARE waves 1 and 2 for parents with
two or three children (>18 and not living in the same household) and conditional on the existence of at least
one transfer; and for US, figures are estimated in McGarry (1999) and Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2009). For
bequests, figures in Europe are computed with SHARE-End of Life waves 2, 3, 4 and 5; and for US, figures
are estimated in  McGarry (1999) and Norton and Van Houtven (2006).
BequestsInter-vivos transfers
Country
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The model shows that compliance with the norm of equal division weakens with an increase in 
income differences of children, and hence parents may prefer to give unequal transfers to their 
children. The econometric results -based on the estimation of the likelihood of equal division- 
support this relationship under different robust checks. In addition, the analysis of the reasons to 
make transfers directly mentioned by the parents in SHARE provides further support to the idea 
that altruism conflicts with the norm of equal division. In particular, only a reduce fraction of 
parents that mention reasons grouped as altruistic or insurance give equal transfers, while that a 
larger share of parents that do not provide specific reasons give equal transfers. Another 
contribution of this paper is the assessment of the role of country level variables on the patterns 
of transfer division. It is found that income inequality, redistribution, pension expenditures and 
average social preferences are useful to explain country differences with respect to the division of 
transfers. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework. 
Section 3 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents and discuss the 
empirical strategy and results. Section 5 analyses the potential role of contextual variables. 
Finally, section 6 provides a conclusion. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 The equal division norm 
 The literature about the motives of parents to make transfers to adult children is large, but 
few studies focus on the division of inter-vivos transfers1. Empirical studies have regularly found 
that the division of bequests among children is mostly equal and bequests are in general much 
larger than inter-vivos transfers. These facts have perhaps contributed to pay less attention to the 
division of inter-vivos transfers. An exception is the study by Bernheim and Severinov (2003), 
                                                 
1 Reviews of the literature on family transfers are Pestieau (2003), Laferrère and Wolff (2006), Arrondel and Masson 
(2006) and Cox and Fafchamps (2008). 
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which offers a unitary framework to understand different patterns of division of bequests and 
inter-vivos transfers. This approach considers a setting of altruistic parents where inter-vivos 
transfers are treated as private information and bequests are public and signal parental affection. 
It is found that the norm of equal division will prevail even in the presence of child income 
inequality, provided that this inequality is not too large. Halvorsen and Thoresen (2011) find 
econometric evidence in Norway suggesting that parents want to divide their inter-vivos transfers 
equally because they are adverse to the inequality of transfers, which is in conflict with their 
altruism. The study by McGarry (1999) contains a brief section that empirically assess the 
determinants of equal division of inter-vivos transfers in the US and find that child income 
differences negatively affect the probability to make equal transfers. These studies offer 
arguments to hypothesise a negative relationship between the degree of child income inequality 
and the strength of the equal division norm. In addition, this also allow to highlight the tension 
between altruism and the equal division norm. 
A variety of reasons can be behind the equal division norm. For example, Lundholm and 
Ohlsson (2000) consider that parents care about a post mortem reputation. This reputation is 
damaged if parents depart from the social norm that stipulates equal sharing among children. In 
Laitner (1997), the social norm of equal sharing of transfers may enhance efficiency by reducing 
rent-seeking behaviour in siblings who compete for larger parental resources and help to preserve 
peace in the family. In Wilhelm (1996) parents equally distribute their estates because they would 
suffer psychological costs (jealousy and family conflict) if they deviate from equal division. 
Similarly, Cremer and Pestieau (1996) cite sociological theory to argue that the unaccomplished 
equal division of estates may lead to dispute among children, which parents fear the most. Equal 
division is a norm that commonly emerges in behavioural economic experiments (Camerer and 
Fehr, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2002). In a model of social image, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) 
argue in favour of a 50–50 norm for a variety of environments (including dictator games 
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comparable with parental decisions about the division of transfers) when individuals are fair-
minded, and people like to be perceived as fair. 
  On the basis of these ideas, next section presents a model that highlights the tensions between 
altruism, child income inequality and the norm of equal division. 
2.2 A model of equal division of transfers 
Consider an altruistic parent who derives utility from her own consumption and the 
consumption of her two children. Budget restrictions dictate that parent’s consumption is equal to 
her income net of transfers given to children, and that consumption of each child is financed out 
of own income and parental transfer. The parent must decide the size and distribution of transfers 
to both children by optimizing the following utility function: 
 
𝑈𝑢 = ln(𝑦𝑝 − 𝑇) + 𝛽[ln(𝑦1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑇) + ln(𝑦2 + 𝑝𝑇)]                                  (1) 
and assume 𝑦𝑝 ≥ 𝑦1 ≥ 𝑦2 ;   𝑝, 𝛽 ϵ[0,1]                                              (2) 
 
 Child consumption is valued through the parameter of parental altruism . yp and yi (i=1,2) 
are parental and child income. In this setting, the parent finds optimal values for the amount of 
total transfer T and shares 1-p and p of this transfer to allocate to child 1 and child 2, respectively. 
The F.O.C. are  
𝛽𝑇(𝑇+𝑦1−𝑦2−2𝑇𝑝)
(𝑇𝑝+𝑦2)(𝑇+𝑦1−𝑇𝑝)
= 0  and 
𝛽(1−𝑝)
(𝑦1+(1−𝑝)𝑇)
+
𝛽𝑝
𝑦2+𝑝𝑇
−
1
𝑦𝑝−𝑇
= 0 , and therefore the 
optimal values are  𝑝 =
𝑦2+𝛽(𝑦2−𝑦1−𝑦𝑝)
𝑦1+𝑦2−2𝛽𝑦𝑝
  and 𝑇 =
2𝛽𝑦𝑝−𝑦1−𝑦2
1+2𝛽
. The division of transfers will always 
be unequal, unless 𝑦2 = 𝑦1. The indirect utility of a parent who intends to give unequal transfers 
is the following: 
 
𝑉𝑢 = (1 + 2𝛽) ln (
𝑦1+𝑦2+𝑦𝑝
1+2𝛽
) + 2𝛽 ln(𝛽)                                           (3) 
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If the parent favours equal division (with p=0.5), then the indirect utility will become: 
 
𝑉𝑒 = ln (
𝑦1+𝑦2+𝑦𝑝
1+2𝛽
) + 𝛽 ln (
𝑦1−𝑦2+4𝛽𝑦1+2𝛽𝑦𝑝
2(1+2𝛽)
) + 𝛽 ln (
𝑦2−𝑦1+4𝛽𝑦2+2𝛽𝑦𝑝
2(1+2𝛽)
)                     (4)  
 
It is not difficult to notice that 𝑉𝑢 − 𝑉𝑒 > 0 when 𝑦1 > 𝑦22. So, a parent that gives equal 
transfers must be an individual for whom the value to stick to the equal division norm compensates 
the loss of utility embedded in the equal division decision. It will be assumed that the altruistic 
parent is also concerned with a norm of equal division and that this can be measured with a 
parameter 𝛾 ϵ [0,1]. Thus, the parent will make equal transfers only if: 
 
𝑉𝑒 ≥ (1 − 𝛾)𝑉𝑢                                                                  (5) 
 
 If the norm of equal division does not matter ( =0) the parent will choose unequal sharing of 
transfers. The parent will give equal transfers only if equation 5 holds, which will be the case for 
a large enough . A latent variable approach may help to clarify the parental dilemma about the 
division of transfers and outline the empirical strategy. Define a latent variable 𝑧∗ such that the 
parent gives equal transfers if 𝑧
∗ ≥ 0, otherwise transfers are unequal. 
 
𝑧∗ = 𝑉𝑒 − (1 − 𝛾)𝑉𝑢                                                            (6)  
 
 The negative or positive value of the latent variable depends on the value of certain 
parameters and variables. It is clear that parents with a concern for equal division  ?̃? ≥ 1 − 𝑉𝑒 𝑉𝑢⁄  
                                                 
2 It holds that 𝑉𝑢 − 𝑉𝑒 = ln (
2𝛽(𝑦1+𝑦2+𝑦𝑝)
𝑦1−𝑦2+4𝛽𝑦1+2𝛽𝑦𝑝
) + ln (
2𝛽(𝑦1+𝑦2+𝑦𝑝)
𝑦2−𝑦1+4𝛽𝑦2+2𝛽𝑦𝑝
) > 0 when 𝑦1 > 𝑦2. 
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will divide their transfers equally; otherwise, they will divide unequally. This means that a higher 
concern with the equal division norm will increase the probability of giving equal transfers. The 
key implication of this setting is that the latent variable diminishes when child income inequality 
increases. Given that 𝑦1 ≥ 𝑦2, an alone increase of child 1´s income is equivalent to a raise in 
child income inequality. Finding a clear cut expression for 𝑑𝑧∗ 𝑑𝑦1⁄ < 0 is possible but tedious. 
Nonetheless, the effects of different values for variables and parameters on 𝑧∗ can be highlighted 
by simulation. This is shown in Figure 1. The left hand side panel of Figure 1 shows the map of 
possible points of equal/unequal division of transfers for different combinations of child income 
inequality and  values. Child income inequality is measured with the ratio 𝑦2/𝑦1 , which is 
bounded between 0 and 1 given the assumption 𝑦1 ≥ 𝑦2 . A ratio closer to 1 indicates more 
equality, and a value closer to 0 indicates more inequality. All points in the darker colour area 
indicate that equal division is optimal –and hence chosen by the parent- for the corresponding pair 
of values in vertical and horizontal axes. It is observed that child income inequality reduces the 
occurrence of equal sharing, and that the concern with the equal division norm increases this. The 
right hand side panel of Figure 1 shows the effect of parental income on the occurrence of equal 
division. This effect is positive because the loss of parental utility due to the equal division is 
relatively less important for a wealthier parent. 
In sum, the parent faces a trade-off. On the one hand, the parent wants to maximize her utility 
by giving unequal transfers according to her altruistic motives, i.e. giving larger transfers to poorer 
children. But on the other hand, the parent is concerned with an equal division norm calling for 
equal distribution of transfers. 
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Figure 1. Existence of equal division in simulations 
                                                                     
         Child income inequality and equal division concern 
 
               Child income inequality and parental income 
 
Note: points in the darker colour area indicate that equal division is optimal for the corresponding pair of values in vertical and 
horizontal axes. It is assumed that  = 0.99; 𝑦𝑝= 10; 𝑦2= 2 in the first panel, and  = 0.99; 𝑦2= 2; =0.05 in the second panel. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Data selection 
 The first two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, 
release 2.6.0) provide the data needed to study the distribution of parental transfers. Only these 
waves are suitable to analyse the equal/unequal division of transfers because they ask for the exact 
amount of monetary inter-vivos transfers given to adult children3. This data has representative and 
comparable information from standardized surveys applied to respondents aged 50+ in Israel and 
14 European countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, 
Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland. The last three 
countries were added in the second wave. The interviews were conducted in 2004/2005 and 
2006/2007 for the first and second waves, respectively (Ireland was included in 2008). The 
variables are at individual and household levels. In total and without any selection, the original 
                                                 
3 Parents can also receive transfers from children but this is minimal. According to Albertini et al. (2007), only 3% 
of parents from the first wave of SHARE receive transfers from children, which contrasts with 21% of parents that 
give transfers to children. 
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dataset includes 30,816 and 36,731 respondents in waves 1 and 2, respectively. In addition to 
standard demographic variables, this dataset includes key questions about financial transfers 
(larger than 250 Euros in the last 12 months) between parents and children4. More detailed 
information about SHARE can be found in Börsch-Supan et al. (2013). Specific methodological 
features of SHARE concerning financial transfers can be consulted in Emery and Mudrazija 
(2015). 
 The sample for analysis is composed of respondents with at least two children that gave at 
least one transfer to any children during the 12 months previous to the interview. The sample does 
not include the cases of respondents that live with their children in the same household nor 
respondents with children aged less than 18 years. The reason, as mentioned in McGarry (1999), 
is that transfers to non-adult children might be due to legal obligations, and it is difficult to 
quantify the value of shared food and housing for co-resident children. Respondents with missing 
values in their own variables and children demographics are also omitted. In SHARE, 
demographic information of respondent’s children is registered for up to four children, while that 
the amount of the financial transfer is recorded up to the third person that receives/gives it. 
Therefore, a further selection considers respondents who have at most three children 
(approximately 86% of respondents fulfilling the previous selections have up to three children). 
Other observations to be dropped are the 3-children (or 2-children) parents that report at least one 
(or two) transfer to a person who is not a child. The reason is that it is not possible to know if the 
unreported children received a transfer or not5. Then, the final sample size consists of a total of 
3,826 observations, with 1,649 and 2,177 observations corresponding to wave 1 and 2. Given the 
                                                 
4 Although transfers below 250 are not captured, this amount represents a small enough percentage of parental income 
in Europe so that the majority and more relevant transfers are recorded in the survey. This is a standard practice in 
other similar surveys like the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics Study 
(AHEAD), which report transfers above US$500. 
5 For example, the case of a parent of three children that reports transfers for two children and her own mother will 
be excluded because the recording of transfers is truncated to three recipients, and hence it is not possible to know if 
the unreported child received a transfer or not.   
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longitudinal design of SHARE, it is important to mention that only 472 individuals are observed 
in both waves.  
3.2 Child income 
Similarly to other datasets based on middle-aged interviewees, the respondent’s child income 
is not directly asked in SHARE. However, child income can be computed with the regression 
coefficients of earning equations estimated with an auxiliary dataset that contains the same child 
demographics available in SHARE. This is done with the European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions dataset (EU-SILC) for years 2005-2008 6  which reference period for 
income is 2004-2007. The log of hourly labour gross income of employees in full-time jobs and 
aged 18-65 is regressed against age, age square, marital status and education level by country and 
sex7. Other authors also impute earnings to solve the lack of information for either children or 
parents. For example, Cox (1987) and Cox and Jakubson (1995) assume that children and parents 
live near each other, so that they use the average income of the metropolitan areas where children 
live to approximate parental income. McGarry (1999) uses the mid points of child income brackets 
-reported by parents- to compute child income. Cox and Rank (1992) use earnings functions 
estimated with the same dataset that contains child information to impute parental income at the 
standardized age of 45. Although it would be desirable to correct the earnings equations for sample 
selection, there is not enough demographic information for children in SHARE. However, as 
suggested by Harmon et al. (2003) in their analysis on the returns of education in European 
countries, some sample bias could exist, but this appears to be small.  
                                                 
6 The log of hourly labour gross income of employees in full-time jobs (aged 18-65) is regressed against age, age 
square, marital status and education level, which are also measured in SHARE. The estimates are available from the 
author upon request. 
7 In addition, a child in part-time occupation is assumed to work the average of hours specific to her country and sex. 
Unemployed children, and those looking after the home or in training are assumed to have zero income. 
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3.3 Variables and descriptive statistics 
About one third of European parents give equal transfers, although there is considerable 
country variation (see Table 1). It is interesting to find distinctive groups such as the Nordic 
countries in the top of the ranking of equal-dividing parents and Mediterranean countries such as 
Greece and Spain in the bottom part. This somewhat reproduces well-established differences in 
welfare regimes and economic inequality. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables 
of interest and used in the econometric analysis. The transfer amount is important for the child 
who receives this. The transfer to child income ratio is 22%. This ratio is larger in the case of 
children that receive unequal transfers (26%) than in that of children receiving equal transfers 
(18%). The variable good health takes value 1 if the respondent reports being at least in good 
health in a 5-scale subjective question on health, and 0 otherwise. The variable top 20% wealth 
takes value 1 if the respondent belongs to the first quintile of the distribution of net wealth in each 
country. Net wealth is used as an indicator of the relative economic situation of the household 
instead of household income because the measure of income is not comparable between waves 1 
and 2. Household gross income was asked in wave 1, but in subsequent waves this was changed 
to net household income.  
In SHARE, respondents who give transfers must also report the main reason for it. Four 
groups can be composed according to these answers. Motive1 indicates the altruistic reason of 
‘meet basic needs’. Motive2 specifies that the transfer was given to help with a large expenditure 
such as a house, furniture, a wedding, etc. Motive 3 indicates that the parent has not a specific 
reason to give the transfer. Motive 4 indicates insurance reasons as ‘help with a divorce’, ‘help 
following a bereavement or illness and ‘to help with unemployment’. Interestingly, 27% of 
parents that give unequal transfers mention altruistic reasons, which contrast with 17% in the case 
of parents that give equal transfers.   
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Given the unit of analysis is the respondent, children variables are transformed in inequality 
measures for each respondent. Inequality is captured with the range, i.e. the difference between 
the highest and lowest value of the relevant variable among children. However, there are two 
exceptions. Child income inequality is measured with the ratio of lowest to highest income of 
children in the family (𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛/𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥)
8, which is bounded between 0 and 1 and hence can ease the 
interpretation of the econometric results. A value closer to one reveals more child income equality 
in the family, and a value closer to 0 indicates more child income inequality. According to the 
theoretical framework, it is expected a positive relationship between the probability of giving 
equal transfers and the ratio 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛/𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥. In order to account for potential evolutionary motives 
(Francesconi et al. 2015, Light and McGarry 2004), the analysis will include a dummy indicating 
that at least one child in the family is adopted or stepchild. The variables contact with parents and 
distance from parent’s home are useful to account for child services9. For example, Cox and Rank 
(1992) consider that the distance between child and parental home is a proxy for the provision of 
child services because services are more costly to offer when the child lives further from her 
parent’s home. Under the exchange approach (Bernheim et al., 1985; Cox, 1987), the parents 
“buy” services from children, paying with a transfer, and hence the children may end up receiving 
different amounts of transfers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 This ratio is preferred to its inverse, otherwise this cannot be defined for the cases of zero income in the denominator. 
In addition, if all children have zero incomes, the ratio is equal to 1. 
9  These variables are originally in brackets, but for the ease of presentation and analysis these variables are 
transformed in a linear variable by taking the midpoints of each bracket.    
 14 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
The idea that altruism conflicts with the norm of equal division finds further support in the 
statistics reported in Table 3. It is found that only a reduce fraction of parents that mention reasons 
grouped as altruistic (27%) or insurance (14%) give equal transfers, while that a larger share of 
parents that do not provide specific reasons give equal transfers (52%). Furthermore, it is observed 
that parents who give transfers with altruistic reasons face more child income inequality (mean 
ratio=0.49) than parents with no specific reasons (mean ratio=0.58). The other statistics in Table 
3 does not seem to be too different among transfer motives. 
 
 
 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Parental characteristics
    Equal division of transfers* 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.36 0.48
    Male* 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50
    Married* 0.68 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.70 0.46
    Age 65.04 9.18 65.18 9.23 65.09 9.20
    Good health* 0.33 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48
    Top 20% wealth* 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45
    Number of children 2.25 0.43 2.35 0.48 2.28 0.45
    Motive 1 (altruistic reasons)* 0.27 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.24 0.43
    Motive 2 (large gifts)* 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.50
    Motive 3 (no spec. reasons)* 0.20 0.40 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.44
    Motive 4 (insurance reasons)* 0.07 0.25 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.22
Within children characteristics
    Income ratio (ymin/ymax) 0.52 0.36 0.58 0.34 0.54 0.35
    Diff. in age 4.89 3.39 4.97 3.16 4.92 3.31
    Diff. in education levels 0.93 1.05 0.90 1.02 0.92 1.04
    Diff. in number of children 1.09 1.11 1.06 1.13 1.08 1.12
    Diff. in contact with parents (days/100) 1.03 1.17 0.90 1.09 0.99 1.14
    Diff. in distance from parent's home (km./100) 1.31 1.73 1.14 1.60 1.25 1.68
    At least one child is adopted 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
Transfers to children
    Total transfers (ppp-Euro) 4,520 6,716 5,317
    Mean of transfer (ppp-Euro) 4,216 3,532 3,872
    Transfer to child income ratio 0.26 0.18 0.22
Observations 2,438 1,388 3,826
* Indicates a dummy variable with values 0/1.
Variable
TotalEqual transfersUnequal transfers
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Table 3. Means of selected variables by motives for transfers 
 
 
4. Econometric results 
4.1 Empirical strategy 
 The analysis of the determinants of the probability of giving equal transfers is performed with 
logit regression models and estimated with maximum likelihood. The unit of analysis is the 
respondent and the sample consists of the two pooled waves of SHARE as defined before 
(n=3826). In terms of the latent variable 𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ , the model can be expressed as: 
 
𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    ;     𝑡 = 1,2              𝑧𝑖𝑡 = { 
1    𝑖𝑓  𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ >  0
0    𝑖𝑓  𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤  0
.                             (7) 
 
 The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parents give equal transfers to all their 
children, and 0 otherwise. A parent decides to divide equally or unequally her transfers by taking 
into account the differences among her children. Vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains these variables and some 
parental demographics as defined in section 3.3, and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Given the longitudinal 
design of SHARE, the error term of equation 7 could be treated as a composite error 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 +
𝑢𝑖𝑡  formed by the unobserved effect 𝑐𝑖  and the idiosyncratic error 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , and apply panel data 
methods to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Although there are only 472 individuals 
observed in both waves, random effects is still an option to check if the estimates hold after 
Variable
    Motive 1 
(altruistic 
reasons)
    Motive 2 
(large gifts)
    Motive 3 
(no spec. 
reasons)
    Motive 4 
(insurance 
reasons)
Equal division of transfers 0.27 0.34 0.52 0.14
Top 20% wealth 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.28
Income ratio (ymin/ymax) 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.51
Diff. in contact with parents (days/100) 0.98 0.96 0.96 1.01
Diff. in distance from parent's home (km./100) 1.28 1.21 1.23 1.19
At least one child is adopted 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11
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controlling for heterogeneity. However, it is not meaningful to apply a fixed effects model because 
the sample of observations with varying values in the dependent variable between both waves is 
very small (only 147) in compassion with the full sample.  
4.2 Main results  
 Table 4 shows the results for the probability of making equal transfers. The first two columns 
report the results of a pooled logit model, first without entering the motives to give transfers 
mentioned by the parents, and then entering these variables. The last column report the results of 
a logit model with random effects. Concerning parental characteristics, it is observed that parents 
that are married, richer and having more children have a higher probability of giving equal 
transfers. The positive relationship between parental affluence and equal division of transfers is 
in line with the theoretical model predictions. The dilemma between giving equal transfers and 
behaving more altruistically (dividing unequally) is less important for a wealthier parent as she 
can better tolerate the loss of utility associated with equal division. The positive relationship 
between the number of children and equal division is somewhat surprising and contradicts what 
have been found in other studies (e.g. Hochguertel and Ohlsson 2009 when using the Health and 
Retirement Study). However, the sample is not strictly comparable with the one analysed in 
Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2009) as the sample in this paper is composed only of parents with two 
or three children and conditional on the existence of at least one transfer10.  
 The key result of the regressions is the positive association between the ratio of child incomes 
𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛/𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 and the probability of giving equal transfers. Recall that this ratio measures income 
equality within the children (a ratio closer to 0 means more inequality and a ratio closer to 1 means 
more equality), so higher child income inequality is negatively related with the likelihood of 
giving equal transfers, as highlighted in the theoretical model. The variables measuring 
                                                 
10 This means that a parent with zero transfers to each child is not treated as an equal divider, simply she is not 
included in the sample. 
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differences in contact with parents and distance from parent’s home are negative and significant. 
This means that the parents care, to some extent, about the differences in services provided by 
their children at the moment they decide between equal and unequal transfers. Therefore, the 
probability of giving equal transfers decreases when the differences in the provision of child 
services becomes too large. In the case of distance from parent’s home, it is expected that a child 
living closer to her parent can offer more services, and that the parent positively values the 
proximity of her child. Although it is not certain the exact motive of the child to live close to her 
parent, the influencing factor in the decision of equal transfers is the difference in distance among 
siblings. 
 Once the parent’s motives to give transfers are introduced (column 2 of Table 4), the results 
basically do not change. The key finding about the relationship between child income inequality 
and equal division is practically unaffected. The coefficient keeps its significance, but the size 
slightly lowers from 0.112 to 0.098. Interestingly, parents that express altruistic reasons have a 
lower probability to give equal transfers, which supports the assumption that altruism rivals with 
equal division. Large financial gifts are also associated with the reduction of the probability of 
equal division. Due to budgets constraints, it will be difficult for the parents to give the same large 
amount to each child. In line with the altruistic reasons mentioned above, the parents that mention 
insurance reasons (help with a divorce, illness, or unemployment) are also less likely to give equal 
transfers. Contrary to the previous effects of parental reported motives, the probability of giving 
equal transfers is positively associated with the parent report no specific reasons to give transfers. 
This case is close to a situation of a “pure” financial gift with no attached strings. In such a case, 
equal division prevails.  
Other two effects are worth to mention. The effect of the difference in the number of 
grandchildren on equal division is negative and significant. A child with a larger family has more 
expenses to cope with and hence she could receive larger transfers from an altruistic parent. 
Therefore, having more differences in the number of grandchildren reduces the likelihood of the 
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parents to give equal transfers. The other effect is the negative impact of having adopted children 
in the family on the decision to give equal transfers. The probability of dividing transfers equally 
decreases by 7% when the respondent has at least one adopted child. This negative relationship 
has also been found in bequest division in Francesconi et al. (2015) and Light and McGarry 
(2004). These last authors argue that, apart from exchange and altruism, parents can be driven by 
evolutionary motives in their transfer behaviour, and hence they will favour biological over non-
biological children. After controlling for heterogeneity with the random effects model, it is 
observed that the results are practically unaffected. 
 
Table 4. Logit marginal effects of the probability of equal transfers 
 
 
dF/dx s.e. dF/dx s.e. dF/dx s.e.
Parental characteristics
    Male 0.018 (0.017) 0.018 (0.019) 0.020 (0.019)
    Married 0.041* (0.022) 0.043** (0.021) 0.054** (0.021)
    Age 0.149 (0.101) 0.029 (0.107) 0.045 (0.104)
    Good health 0.021 (0.019) 0.019 (0.020) 0.024 (0.020)
    Top 20% wealth 0.032*** (0.010) 0.031*** (0.011) 0.040*** (0.013)
    Number of children 0.191*** (0.035) 0.194*** (0.036) 0.242*** (0.044)
Within children characteristics
    Income ratio (ymin/ymax) 0.112*** (0.033) 0.098** (0.038) 0.119*** (0.041)
    Diff. in age -0.007 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) -0.007** (0.004)
    Diff. in education levels -0.009 (0.011) -0.009 (0.011) -0.010 (0.010)
    Diff. in number of children -0.024** (0.011) -0.027*** (0.010) -0.033*** (0.011)
    Diff. in contact with parents (days/100) -0.029*** (0.006) -0.028*** (0.006) -0.033*** (0.006)
    Diff. in distance from parent's home (km./100) -0.024*** (0.004) -0.024*** (0.005) -0.030*** (0.005)
    At least one child is adopted -0.073*** (0.024) -0.070*** (0.025) -0.082*** (0.020)
Motives to make transfers
    Motive 1 (altruistic reasons) -0.108*** (0.020) -0.118*** (0.022)
    Motive 2 (large gifts) -0.042* (0.025) -0.050** (0.023)
    Motive 3 (no spec. reasons) 0.144*** (0.022) 0.183*** (0.025)
    Motive 4 (insurance reasons) -0.234*** (0.024) -0.235*** (0.024)
pseudo R
2 0.065 0.099
number of observations 3826 3826 3826
Regressions include dummy variables for country and wave. Robust clustered (by country) standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
(1) (2) (3) random effects
Variable
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4.3 Additional checks 
 The sample was selected to include only respondents with up to three children because the 
survey only registers up to three persons receiving financial transfers. The results do not change 
considerably if the regressions are applied separately to samples of parents with two and three 
children. The variable of interest -child income ratio- maintains its direction and significance. For 
example, the marginal effect found in the first model of Table 4 become 0.1056 (s.e.=0.0385) and 
0.1116 (s.e.=0.0343) in the sample of parents with two and three children, respectively. Equal 
transfers could be underestimated if unequal transfers are very similar under different “windows” 
in the value of the transfers given to each child. For example, Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2009) 
report different estimates of equal division by allowing an absolute deviation of 20% from the 
intra-family mean of each transfer received by siblings; Wilhelm (1996) allows a variation of 
±2%. In the sample analysed in this paper, there are not important changes in the frequency of 
equal transfers if a large window of 20% of the intra-family transfer mean is allowed. In this case, 
the frequency of equal transfers increases from 36.3% to 37.4%. The use of this new dependent 
variable in the first regression model of Table 4 does not change the direction and significance of 
the coefficient for child income ratio, although there is an increase in the size of the effect to 
0.1349 (s.e.=0.0285).  
The analysis employs the child income ratio 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛/𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 as a measure of the degree of income 
inequality among children. The use of two other inequality measures, the range and the square of 
the coefficient of variation, also provides support for a negative relationship between child income 
inequality and the probability of giving equal transfers. Among these two measures, the squared 
coefficient of variation is better established in the empirical literature as this belongs to the family 
of additive and decomposable inequality measures (Shorrocks, 1980). Similarly, Light and 
McGarry (2004) use the coefficient of variation of child income as a child income inequality 
measure. Table 5 reports negative and statistically significant coefficients for these inequality 
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measures when model 1 of Table 4 is used as the baseline. These results (direction and statistically 
significance) are also maintained hen models 2 and 3 of Table 4 are used instead. 
 
Table 5. Marginal effect of alternative measures of child income inequality 
 
 
5. The role of country level variables 
 Cross-country differences in macro variables and attitudes at the societal level may shed some 
light to understand different patterns of equal division. Table 6 contains some of these variables 
with a potential influence on the transfer division variation by country. In particular, a score for 
altruism in the country is computed with a question included in the World Values Survey (WVS) 
and the European Social Survey (ESS)11. Interestingly, the correlation between average altruism 
and the frequency of equal division in the country is negative (-0.182), which is in line with the 
previously highlighted tension between equal division and altruism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This is a question to derive the Schwartz value of benevolence associated with altruism. The question is as follows: 
“Tell me how much each person is or is not like you: It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. 
She/he wants to care for their well-being”. The recoded scale ranges from 6 (very much like me) to 1 (not like me at 
all), and hence, a higher score means more altruism. 
Variable dF/dx mean
Child income ratio (ymin/ymax) 0.1124*** 0.542
(0.0334)
Child income range (ymax - ymin) -0.0561*** 0.770
(0.0139)
Squared coefficient of variation -0.1111*** 0.251
(0.0253)
Each cell contains the coefficient of a regression with a different child income
inequality variable. The models are similar to model 1 of Table 4. *** indicates
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
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Table 6. Variables at the country level (circa 2006) 
 
 
According to the econometric results showing that wealthier parents are more likely to give 
equal transfers, it could be the case that parents from countries with more generous pension 
regimes are in a better position to divide their transfers equally. Indeed, this is observed when the 
percentage of parents that give equal transfers in the country is plotted against total pension 
expenditures (see left panel of Figure 2). The correlation between the frequency of equal division 
and pension expenditures is larger if both mandatory and voluntary pensions are included in 
pension expenditures (r=0.448). If only mandatory pensions were included, the correction would 
be 0.343. This reflects the importance of voluntary pension plans in some countries. The variable 
that shows the clearest relation with the division of transfers is the Gini index of disposable 
incomes (see right panel of Figure 2). These variables report a large correlation of -0.831. Parents 
living in more egalitarian countries are more likely to equally divide their transfers. This pattern 
suggests that the outcome of equal division is more likely when child income differences are also 
lower. In addition, the degree of redistribution implemented in the country -measured as the Gini 
Country
Frequency 
of equal 
transfers 
(%)
Altruism
Mandatory 
expenditures in 
pensions 
(%GDP)
Mandatory and 
voluntary 
expenditures in 
pensions 
(%GDP)
Gini of 
disposable 
income
Gini of 
market 
income
Redistribution 
(Gini mkt inc / 
Gini disp inc)
Inheritance 
tax rate 
(min)
Inheritance 
tax rate 
(max)
Inheritance 
tax rate 
(average)
Austria 32.14 4.80 10.85 11.38 25.30 45.00 1.78 2.00 15.00 8.50
Germany 27.27 4.78 8.96 9.73 26.80 55.20 2.06 7.00 30.00 18.50
Sweden 49.26 4.52 9.20 11.25 24.00 43.20 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 35.26 4.81 5.36 8.95 26.40 44.20 1.67 5.00 27.00 16.00
Spain 20.00 4.83 6.48 6.48 31.90 45.60 1.43 7.65 34.00 20.83
Italy 36.72 4.96 12.75 12.97 32.10 47.90 1.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 38.48 4.59 11.06 11.14 27.30 50.70 1.86 5.00 40.00 22.50
Denmark 45.02 4.92 7.39 9.50 23.70 44.20 1.86 2.10 2.10 2.10
Greece 15.99 5.15 9.94 10.32 34.30 48.90 1.43 1.00 1.00 1.00
Switzerland 35.53 4.94 11.54 11.56 30.40 46.50 1.53 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 43.73 4.89 7.27 10.54 27.80 48.70 1.75 3.00 30.00 16.50
Czech Rep. 35.93 4.34 6.95 6.95 25.30 45.20 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poland 22.12 4.71 9.39 9.39 33.30 53.00 1.59 3.00 7.00 5.00
Ireland 18.42 5.08 2.92 3.83 31.90 48.50 1.52 20.00 20.00 20.00
United States 9.23 4.52 5.24 9.31 38.00 48.60 1.28 18.00 55.00 36.50
Note: The frequency of equal transfers for US is inferred from Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2009). The score for altruism is computed for 50+ individuals from the question “tell
me how much each person is or is not like you: It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being” (available in the
ESS/2004 and WVS/2006). The recoded scale ranges from 6 (very much like me) to 1 (not like me at all), and hence, a higher score means more altruism. The gini coefficients
come from Eurostat for Europe and OECD for US, circa 2006. Pension data is drawn from the OECD social expenditure database. Mandatory expenditures in pensions
correspond to private and public expenditure in old-age benefits as % of GDP for year 2006; and voluntary expenditures correspond to voluntary private expenses in old-age
benefits. Czech Republic and Poland have not data available for voluntary expenses. Inheritance tax rates correspond to direct heirs (spouse and children) and are drawn from
the CESifo-DICE report "Inheritance Taxation, General Characteristics, 2007". The tax rate information for direct heirs in Poland and Greece comes from the 2013 report.
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of market income to Gini of disposable income ratio- is positively related to the share of equal 
transfers (r=0.654). It seems that the efforts of the government to redistribute incomes in the 
country reduce somewhat the need of parents to make compensatory transfers to their children. 
Another variable with potential influence on the division of transfers is the level of taxation 
on bequests. In countries with high inheritance taxes, parents may prefer to substitute bequests 
with intra-vivos transfers in order to reduce the tax burden. Therefore, it will be interesting to 
explore whether this substitution effect has any consequence in the way parents divide inter-vivos 
transfers. The correlation between equal division of transfers and the average inheritance tax rate 
in the country is strong and negative (r=-0.498), although it is not obvious how to interpret this 
relationship. On one hand, one could expect that parents with a strong concern with the norm of 
equal division will distribute equally their states in advance by making equal inter-vivos transfers. 
On the other hand, inter-vivos transfers are easier to hide than bequests from one child to another 
and therefore parents may exploit this feature to give unequal transfers and prevent, for example, 
jealously from children or repay for child services. In any case, the negative relationship between 
equal division of transfers and inheritance tax is closer to the latter reason. 
 
Figure 2. Equal division of transfers, pension expenditures and income inequality 
 
Equal division of transfers and total compulsory and 
voluntary expenditures in pensions 
 
Equal division of transfers and income inequality 
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The relationship between equal division and macro variables are better tested in the 
framework of previous logit model regressions. For this, the country dummies included in the 
models derived from equation 7 must be replaced by variables at the country level. The results of 
these new regressions are reported in Table 7. In general, it is observed that the coefficients, 
statistically significance and directions of the variables at the respondent level basically do not 
change. In particular, the effect of child income inequality on equal division is unaffected. Only 
one macro variable is introduced in each of the first four models of Table 7, and then all of them 
are added to the model in the last column. It is observed that income inequality in the country 
reduces the probability of giving equal transfers. Larger pension expenditures increase the 
likelihood of equal division only once the other macro variables are also included (last column of 
Table 7). An interesting outcome, that confirms the theoretical model and previous econometric 
results, is the negative and significant relationship between equal division and the level of altruism 
in the country. Furthermore, it is observed that inheritance taxes reduce the probability of equal 
division when the other macro variables are also included in the model. In terms of size effects 
(last model of Table 7), one percentage point increase in the Gini index will decrease the 
probability of equal division by 2.2%, while that an extra percentage point in the pension 
expenditures to GDP ratio will increase the probability of equal division by 2.8%. In the case of 
the score of societal altruism (bounded between 1 and 6 with mean 4.79), one extra point in the 
score will reduce the probability of giving equal transfers by 11.8%. Furthermore, a 1-percentage-
point change in inheritance taxes reduces the probability of equal division slightly by 0.2%. In 
sum, country variables provide evidence that parents can more easily care about equal division 
when incomes are more equally distributed in the country, pension benefits are larger, altruism is 
less strong and inheritances taxes are lower. 
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Table 7. Logit marginal effects of the probability of equal transfers 
 
 
  
6. Conclusion 
 Approximately 36% of parents drawn from a sample of 14 European countries divide equally 
their transfers, although there is important cross-country variation (from 16% in Greece to 49% 
in Sweden). The high frequency of equal division found in Europe contrasts with the results of 
previous studies -mostly based on US data- that report about 6%-9% of parents giving equal 
transfers. The present study argues that altruistic parents are also concerned with the equal 
division of transfers to different degrees, and hence they do not offset child income inequality as 
predicted by the standard altruistic model of family transfers. Indeed, the theoretical model 
presented in Section 2 highlights the tension between being altruistic towards children (i.e., 
favouring the poorer child with larger transfers) and following a norm of equal division. The 
hypothesis that child income inequality rivals with the decision of giving equal transfers is 
supported by the econometric results under different model specifications and robust checks. The 
dF/dx s.e. dF/dx s.e. dF/dx s.e. dF/dx s.e. dF/dx s.e.
Country level variables
    Gini index of disposable income -0.024*** (0.006) -0.022*** (0.004)
    Total pension expenditure in pensions 0.014 (0.014) 0.025*** (0.006)
    Altruism -0.305** (0.127) -0.118*** (0.036)
    Inheritance tax rate -0.002 (0.003) -0.002** (0.001)
Parental characteristics
    Male 0.015 (0.018) 0.011 (0.015) 0.016 (0.019) 0.013 (0.016) 0.018 (0.019)
    Married 0.047** (0.023) 0.045* (0.024) 0.044** (0.022) 0.044* (0.023) 0.045** (0.022)
    Age/100 0.025 (0.098) -0.033 (0.126) 0.023 (0.103) -0.035 (0.119) 0.002 (0.102)
    Good health 0.031 (0.025) 0.051** (0.022) 0.053*** (0.020) 0.047*** (0.018) 0.024 (0.021)
    Top 20% wealth 0.030*** (0.012) 0.033*** (0.012) 0.030** (0.012) 0.035*** (0.011) 0.034*** (0.011)
    Number of children 0.196*** (0.036) 0.193*** (0.035) 0.192*** (0.034) 0.195*** (0.034) 0.200*** (0.035)
Within children characteristics
    Income ratio (ymin/ymax) 0.107*** (0.040) 0.120*** (0.037) 0.111*** (0.034) 0.117*** (0.036) 0.106*** (0.038)
    Diff. in age -0.006 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) -0.007* (0.004)
    Diff. in education levels -0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.011) -0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.010) -0.008 (0.011)
    Diff. in number of children -0.024*** (0.009) -0.019** (0.010) -0.023** (0.009) -0.019** (0.009) -0.025*** (0.010)
    Diff. in contact with parents (days/100) -0.028*** (0.006) -0.026*** (0.006) -0.029*** (0.007) -0.026*** (0.006) -0.028*** (0.006)
    Diff. in distance from parent's home (km./100) -0.022*** (0.005) -0.020*** (0.005) -0.022*** (0.005) -0.019*** (0.005) -0.025*** (0.005)
    At least one child is adopted -0.062** (0.025) -0.033 (0.026) -0.047* (0.028) -0.034 (0.028) -0.067*** (0.025)
Motives to make transfers
    Motive 1 (altruistic reasons) -0.109*** (0.022) -0.123*** (0.023) -0.120*** (0.023) -0.123*** (0.023) -0.112*** (0.022)
    Motive 2 (large gifts) -0.052* (0.027) -0.054* (0.030) -0.057** (0.027) -0.054* (0.030) -0.049** (0.024)
    Motive 3 (no spec. reasons) 0.152*** (0.024) 0.143*** (0.026) 0.152*** (0.023) 0.146*** (0.026) 0.148*** (0.022)
    Motive 4 (insurance reasons) -0.235*** (0.025) -0.236*** (0.025) -0.238*** (0.026) -0.238*** (0.024) -0.233*** (0.028)
pseudo R
2
0.090 0.073 0.083 0.073 0.095
number of observations 3826 3826 3826 3826 3826
Regressions include a dummy for wave. Robust clustered (by country) standard errors are in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
(3)
Variable
(1) (2) (5)(4)
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key finding is that the likelihood of giving equal transfers is negatively associated with more child 
income inequality. Moreover, the econometric results also suggest that other motivations play a 
role in the decision to make equal transfers. Exchange motives are in place because parents care, 
to some extent, about the differences in services provided by their children (measured by child 
differences in contact with parents and distance from parent’s home) at the moment to decide 
between equal and unequal transfers. Evolutionary motives are also revealed by the negative effect 
of having adopted children on the probability of giving equal transfers. 
In addition, variables at the level of the country shed light to explain country differences with 
respect to the division of transfers. There is evidence that the probability of giving equal transfers 
is positively affected when incomes are more equally distributed in the country, pension benefits 
are larger, the level of societal altruism is less strong and inheritances taxes are lower. It seems 
that the inclusion and assessment of contextual variables is worth to pursue in future research 
agenda. 
 
 
Disclaimer 
This paper uses data from SHARE Waves 1, 2, 3 (SHARELIFE), 4 and 5 (DOIs: 
10.6103/SHARE.w1.260, 10.6103/SHARE.w2.260, 10.6103/SHARE.w3.100, 
10.6103/SHARE.w4.111, 10.6103/SHARE.w5.100), see Börsch-Supan et al. (2013) for 
methodological details. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European 
Commission through FP5 (QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, 
COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-
PREP: N°211909, SHARE-LEAP: N°227822, SHARE M4: N°261982). Additional funding from 
the German Ministry of Education and Research, the U.S. National Institute on Aging 
(U01_AG09740-13S2, P01_AG005842, P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1-AG-
4553-01, IAG_BSR06-11, OGHA_04-064) and from various national funding sources is 
gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org).  
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